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Thus far, there has been a dearth of studies that systemically examine the relationship between
diaspora philanthropy, the development community and securitised migration regimes. This
article addresses this by responding to the research question, “How coherent are securitised
migration policies with diaspora philanthropy and the transformative development objectives
that characterise the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agenda?” The analysis is based
on the concept of policy coherence for development (PCD). The article compares the simulta-
neous regionalization and securitization of European Union and United States migration poli-
cies and contends that these policy strategies undermine diaspora philanthropy, development
partnerships and transformative development. Normative change must be introduced in order
to establish coherence between globalized migration policies and diaspora philanthropy objec-
tives. Normative coherence for development can be achieved by introducing principles from
the SDG’s and the Busan Development Partnership Agreement amongst other international
development agendas, into migration policy-making at the national and regional levels.
INTRODUCTION
The year 2015 was characterized by an important paradox in relation to development and migra-
tion. On one hand, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) announced in September of that
year were supposed to change the indicator-based Millennium Development Goals (MDG) into a
more transformative development programme, including human rights. Conversely, the high proﬁle
crises related to unauthorized sea-based migration in the Mediterranean Basin and the terrorist
attacks of 13 November in Paris provided explosive fodder for political discourse painting asylum
seekers as security threats. These contrasts highlight the character of debates on migration and
development: migrants are simultaneously viewed as risks and resources. Consequently, the rela-
tionship between migration and development remains ambiguous.
Even though the nature of the relationship between migration and development remains unclear,
migrants have historically contributed to development as actors. This has been widely recognized
by international organizations and ﬁnancial institutions which have focused numerous initiatives on
migrant remittances. Ofﬁcially recorded money transfers to the developing world totalled US$ 440
billion in 2015, representing 75% of all remittances worldwide (http://www.worldbank.org/en/
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news/press-release/2015/04/13/remittances-growth-to-slow-sharply-in-2015-as-europe-and-russia-stay-
weak-pick-up-expected-next-year). A major question at the heart of these programmes asks: how
can migrants be better integrated into development strategies?
The notion of diaspora philanthropy, broadly deﬁned as a diaspora’s transfer of resources to its
country of origin in the framework of transnational philanthropy, has evolved within this context.
The emerging literature on diaspora philanthropy generally examines the actions of the migrants or
the policies of their home states in relation to diaspora philanthropy. Thus far, there has been a
dearth of studies that examine the relationship between diaspora philanthropy, the development
community and the global migration regime. This article addresses this issue by asking, “How
coherent are global migration policies with diaspora philanthropy and transformative development
objectives?” The analysis presented below is based on the conceptual approach of policy coherence
for development (PCD). PCD is an important policy tool and normative framework that has
been championed by the EU and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) since the 1990s. It proposes policy-making mechanisms aimed at preventing policies in
non-development arenas from undermining development strategies. This article examines the recent
securitization of migration policies and how it has affected development cooperation.
The article is divided into four parts. Following this introduction, part two presents the literature
on diaspora philanthropy within the framework of broader discussions on migration, development
and security and it introduces the concept of policy coherence for development. Part three then
empirically examines the emergence of diaspora philanthropy strategies within the context of the
securitization of development cooperation. Finally, part four presents conclusions.
Research design and methods
This article examines diaspora philanthropy within the framework of securitized development coop-
eration in the EU and the US. The cases are comparable because both polities are regional hege-
mons in terms of migration and security and both are important development aid donors.
Conversely, the polities have demonstrated different levels of commitment to PCD as the EU has
institutionalized PCD whereas the US has not. In terms of methods, the article is based on a review
of secondary literature; EU, OECD, United Nations (UN), World Bank, International Organization
for Migration (IOM) and Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) policy documents,
as well as reports from non-governmental organizations.
DIASPORA PHILANTHROPY, DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY: WHAT ROLE FOR
PCD?
The literature on diaspora philanthropy has emerged signiﬁcantly in recent years. Newland, Tar-
razas and Munster (2010) attribute this to three factors: 1) new development actors, 2) new trends
in global philanthropy and 3) new trends in diaspora engagement. In general, the literature on this
subject has focused on three different approaches. The ﬁrst relates to the deﬁnition and operational-
ization of diaspora philanthropy. According to Johnson, diaspora philanthropy is the transfer of
resources back to home countries “as investments for the social good”. (Johnson, 2007). While this
conceptualization is relatively straightforward, the operationalization of diaspora philanthropy has
been more problematic.
The literature on diaspora philanthropy recognises the heterogeneity of practices in this ﬁeld.
This is especially signiﬁcant for the literature on diaspora and conﬂict. Laakso and Hautaniemi
(2014) show how diasporas can both contribute to the perpetuation of conﬂict and foster peace and
reconciliation processes. Of course, the mechanisms for conﬂict resolution or prolongation relate to
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the resources that diasporas mobilise. Do they fund politicized movements? Are initiatives group-
speciﬁc or generalised (which is especially relevant for ethnically divided societies)?
Another relevant question asks: What relationships exist between diaspora philanthropy and
development aid?. In general, diaspora initiatives can complement, substitute or even undermine
development policies (Laakso and Hautaniemi, 2014). This variety of policy impacts is caused by
the myriad of ways through which diaspora philanthropy is conducted. Newland, Terraza and Mun-
ster (2010) recognize that diaspora philanthropy can be carried out by localized, low-income
migrant communities through “hometown associations” or very wealthy migrants who have the
means to generalize the impacts of their giving. Also, many organizations donate directly to speci-
ﬁc initiatives whereas other migrants give indirectly through intermediaries and foundations (even
through the internet).
This heterogeneity in the ﬁeld of diaspora philanthropy has led to the second group of studies
which empirically examines speciﬁc practices in different countries. The migrant groups which are
most engaged in diaspora philanthropy come from Philippines, India, China, and Mexico. Gei-
thener, Chen and Johnson (2005) comparatively analysed the impacts of diaspora philanthropy ini-
tiatives conducted by high-skilled Chinese and Indian migrants aimed at equitable development in
these two highly unequal economies. Orozco and Rouse (2007) studied the local impacts of home-
town associations in Mexico. Espinosa (2015) examined projects initiated by Filipinos working in
the domestic sector. Other scholars have documented diaspora philanthropy in diverse contexts such
as Colombia (Aysa-Lastra, 2007), Ghana (Ong’ayo, 2014) and Egypt (Brinkerhoff, 2008).
The third group of studies in the literature on diaspora philanthropy focuses on policy contexts
surrounding this phenomenon. These studies have largely been promoted by international organiza-
tions such as the IOM, World Bank, etc. or think tanks such as the Migration Policy Institute. The
most complete academic work in this sub-ﬁeld has been published by Brinkerhoff (2012). This arti-
cle theorizes the relationship between diasporas and their homeland governments, proposes a frame-
work through which homeland governments can enable diasporas’ development contributions and
identiﬁes mechanisms for the operationalization of this framework. Other works in this ﬁeld speciﬁ-
cally discuss implementation mechanisms. For example, Kleist and Vammen (2012) contend that
development policies conducted in association with diaspora philanthropy should be implemented
through a participatory approach in which diasporas are consulted on the formulation of migration
and development policy objectives.
Migration, Development and Security: What Role for PCD?
Diaspora philanthropy is not only an academic paradigm or a policy tool, it is also a normative
phenomenon because it embraces the notion of globalized citizenship. For this reason, this arti-
cle contends that diaspora philanthropy must be discussed within the context of the “migration-
development-security nexus.” Because diaspora philanthropy recognizes globalized citizenship, it is
highly relevant to migration-development-security debates that reinforce nation-state sovereignty.
The literature on migration, development and security has evolved signiﬁcantly since the 1990s.
The literature on the “security-migration nexus” has focused on national security issues. Adamson
(2006) claimed that migration was viewed as a threat to national security in terms of shifting 1)
state capacity and autonomy, 2) balance of power and 3) the nature of conﬂict. As the nature of
conﬂict became more decentralized and as non-state security threats emerged further, migration has
been viewed as a symbol of both the erosion of state power (Rudolph, 2003) and the international
conceptualization of “security” that has become nebulous due to the emergence of new threats and
deﬁnitions.
These themes have also emerged in the more speciﬁc literature on border/migration controls.
Authors such as Peter Andreas (2012) have focused their analyses on mechanisms that have
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developed between the securitization of migration and the emergence of a border control industry
that has militarized border regions in advanced industrial states. This literature examines the rela-
tionship between public perceptions of borders as dangerous areas, the resulting militarization of
these borders and the subsequent increase in transnational smuggling and trafﬁcking. Carling
(2007), amongst others, has written about the human consequences of these processes.
It is within this framework that the “migration-development” literature has emerged but surpris-
ingly, it has been characterized by a signiﬁcant cleavage. On one hand, observers have noted that
migration has played a signiﬁcant role in the securitization of development cooperation. Scholars
such as Than-Dam Truong and Des Gasper (2011) have identiﬁed state concerns about migration
as a key mechanism for the securitization of development aid amongst donors such as the European
Union and the United States. They discuss four policy concerns which have facilitated securitiza-
tion of development aid. These are: 1) post-conﬂict reconstruction and durable solutions for refu-
gees, 2) control over movements facilitated by privately organized networks that undermine state
surveillance and challenge state sovereignty, 3) the perceived costs and beneﬁts of migration to
hosts and sending states and the lack of sustainable co-development strategies; 4) globalization, the
expansion of the knowledge society and governance of the supply of talents.
Conversely, another literature on migration and development has analysed emerging partnerships
in the ﬁeld. This literature has become both extensive and opaque in response to the question: does
migration support or undermine development? Some authors, such as Adams, Jr. and Page (2003)
contend that migration is a vital resource in the global ﬁght against poverty because they recognize
migrants as development actors. Other scholars have contended that migration and remittances have
had limited impacts because of unattractive investment environments in sending states (de Haas,
2005) and structural imbalances that exist in global markets (Castle and Delgado Wise, 2007).
This article contends that these debates are limited in their focus. Because they question whether
migration facilitates or hinders development and how migrants contribute to development, they fail
to recognize an important normative aspect of the migration-development-security nexus that asks:
what kind of development should be pursued by migrants and nation-states alike?
It is within this normative framework that policy coherence for development is relevant to discus-
sions on diaspora philanthropy. PCD has emerged as an important policy tool since the 1990s. The
EU adopted PCD with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement in
2000 (Laakso et al., 2007). However, only in 2005 was PCD established on the EU agenda with
the Commission adopting a communication with a focus on PCD and the EU Council adopting
conclusions on PCD (CEPS, 2006). PCD was also integrated into the EU development policy pro-
gramme, (European Consensus on Development, EU 2006). The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 further
reinforced the European Union commitment to PCD, stating that “the Union shall take account of
development cooperation in policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing coun-
tries” (Art. 208). The EU is also committed to a biannual PCD reporting process (European Com-
mission, 2007, 2011). In 2007, the decision was made to focus on ﬁve priority areas: trade and
ﬁnance, climate change, global food security, migration, and security. In 2010, the European Com-
mission presented the Policy Coherence for Development Work Programme (EC, 2010) for the
years 2010-2013, structured around these ﬁve priority areas.
PCD has become so prominent in European politics that it now represents a political statement in
global affairs. No longer simply a technical tool, PCD holds a normative value because it priori-
tizes human development over competing policy arenas. In principle, it can be justiﬁed with differ-
ent arguments. First, PCD aims to ensure that developing countries’ current or future prospects are
not hurt by industrialized countries’ policies (Chang, 2003). Second, PCD highlights the transfor-
mative nature of the SDG agenda and is an important policy statement in support of more equitable
development.
Thus far, the literature on PCD and migration has focused too speciﬁcally on remittances and
economic impacts. Dayton-Johnson and Katseli (2006), for example analyse OECD development
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policies through the lens of “ﬂows.” Speciﬁcally, they discuss aid ﬂows, migration ﬂows, foreign
direct investment (FDI) and trade ﬂows. The report coins the term “coherence orphans” to describe
a situation in which poor countries receive aid without any of the other ﬂows that are needed to
complement it. For these authors, PCD is deﬁned as complementarity of ﬂows which suggests the
need to manage circulation rather than control ﬂows at borders. The 2005 study completed by
Xenogiani also examined PCD and trade, foreign direct investment and migration with a focus on
how migration policies could complement policy-making in these arenas.
Nyberg-Sorensen et al. (2002) took a broader approach to the issue of PCD and migration by
investigating the coherence between “relief, recovery, development and conﬂict prevention”. This
study goes beyond the traditional economic realm and incorporates a vision of development based
on political stability. In the literature on development, scholars acknowledge that the line between
humanitarian aid and development cooperation is often blurred. The authors ask: How can both
humanitarian aid and development strategies be supported by migration policies? The recommenda-
tion of this study is that development aid is more effective than humanitarian assistance because of
the active participation of migrants in this process. The most recent work by Nyberg-Sorensen
(2016) reﬂects on the aforementioned study and its impact on Danish development cooperation.
According to the author, the goal of coherence between migration policies and development may
have been “unrealistic” (Nyberg-Sorensen, 2016: p. 62).
It is within this framework that the issue of normative PCD is relevant to the ﬁeld of diaspora
philanthropy. As stated above, the diaspora philanthropy literature focuses heavily on the activities
of migrants and the policies of their home countries. This article contends that this context needs to
be expanded. How can we discuss diaspora philanthropy without addressing its coherence with the
international migration regime? The securitization of both migration and development through pol-
icy strategies aimed at reinforcing the sovereignty of nation-states seems incompatible with diaspora
philanthropy initiatives based on global citizenship and transnationalism. For this reason, this article
discusses emerging diaspora philanthropy practices in relation to regionalized security agendas
through the lens of policy coherence for development.
POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND DIASPORA PHILANTHROPY
As stated above, diaspora philanthropy has become popular in both the migration and development
communities. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), amongst other organizations,
has noted that resourcing development is one of the most important aspects of the SDG agenda.
Even though ofﬁcial development aid (ODA) continues to grow, reaching US$ 134.8 billion in
2013 (Grady, 2014), its proportion to the total ﬁnancial ﬂows from OECD member states to the
developing world is declining.
Diaspora philanthropy has, in fact, been viewed by many donor states as a “gap-ﬁller” during
this time of ﬁnancial constraint. The Outcome Document from the UN’s Third Financing for
Development Conference held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 13-16 July, 2015 (United Nations,
2015a) identiﬁes the need to facilitate migrant remittances and other money transfers as a key prior-
ity for the global development ﬁnancing agenda. However, international organizations view much
stronger potential in diaspora philanthropy. The International Organization for Migration (IOM)
and the Joint Migration and Development Initiative (JMDI) have included diaspora engagement
amongst their priorities. In 2013, the IOM reshaped its International Dialogue on Migration into
“The Diaspora Ministerial Conference on Diasporas and Development: Bridging Societies and
States”. This meeting provided a forum in which global leaders could share experiences related to
diaspora and development. The agenda reinforced IOM’s “3E” (engage, enable and empower)
approach to facilitating diaspora participation in development cooperation. The meeting speciﬁcally
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addressed the issues of diaspora resources, strategic partnerships and the potential positive impacts
of diasporas on crisis situations.
Similarly the JMDI, in which the IOM is a participant as well, has promoted diaspora participa-
tion in development cooperation. The JMDI stresses the “local to local” dimensions of migration
and development. It promotes strategic partnerships between local governments and civil society
that address local needs. Within this framework, it emphasizes the importance of diaspora philan-
thropy for the links that it promotes between local authorities in home and host countries and the
connections that it establishes between local governments and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). It is important to note that the EU is one of the main funders of this initiative.
These themes have also ﬁgured prominently in the Global Forum on Migration and Development
(GFMD). This forum presents a platform for policymakers and representatives of NGOs to infor-
mally exchange views on migration and development issues. Diaspora philanthropy has featured
prominently in the yearly GFMD meetings. The ongoing discussions led to the publication of a
handbook for policymakers and practitioners entitled Developing a Roadmap for Engaging Diaspo-
ras in Development. The purpose of these discussions and the resulting handbook is the establish-
ment of effective strategic development partnerships around diaspora philanthropy.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the World Bank’s recognition of diaspora philanthropy has also
increased in recent years, albeit from a more technical point of view. Under the broader heading of
“diaspora engagement”, the World Bank has proposed a set of ﬁnancial tools through which dias-
pora philanthropy can be promoted and further linked to development cooperation. These include:
1) mobilization of diaspora savings through diaspora bonds, 2) promotion of a risk-based approach
to anti-money laundering and countering the ﬁnancing of terror (AML/CFT) in order to reduce
remittance fees and 3) diaspora transfers as collateral for international borrowing (World Bank,
2015). Thus, the World Bank, like the IOM, the GFMD and the JMDI, recognizes the potential for
diaspora philanthropy as an important form of development cooperation. However, these initiatives
have been promoted in a vacuum without contextualization in the securitized political environment
that currently encompasses global migration debates. This is discussed below.
PCD as a Policy Tool versus PCD as a Normative Statement
The previous section has outlined the international recognition of diaspora philanthropy in develop-
ment discussions and the promotion of this paradigm through policies that focus on migrant com-
munities themselves. This article takes a more critical approach. It inquires whether diaspora
philanthropy can be considered effective development cooperation by analysing its coherence
within securitized migration debates. The argument presented here states that diaspora philanthropy
is not hindered by characteristics of migrant communities but instead, the securitized environment
that permeates migration in development cooperation undermines it.
PCD in fact, is not a static concept. Classical analysis of PCD compares a donor’s development
policies to non-development policy arenas (horizontal incoherence) in order to assure that non-
development initiatives are not undermining development cooperation objectives. However, scholars
of PCD such as Carbone (2008) have recognized different incoherences in development coopera-
tion. These typologies are illustrated in table one.
Table 1 highlights in italics those incoherences which are discussed in the diaspora philanthropy
literature. Even though academic and policy studies of diaspora philanthropy do not mention PCD
by name, they do often justify this paradigm by referring to at least one of the concepts in the
table. For example, the previously mentioned handbook entitled Developing a Roadmap for Engag-
ing Diasporas in Development which was jointly published by the International Organization for
Migration and the Migration Policy Institute (2012) has justiﬁed the importance of government-
diaspora partnerships through analysis of internal coherence (how diasporas can inform
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development policy means and objectives), inter-organizational coherence (how diasporas can
bridge gaps between governments in home and host countries and NGOs) and donor-recipient
coherence (how diasporas can contribute to constructive dialogue between actors in donor and aid
recipient countries).
These themes are also present in a seminal article on diaspora philanthropy governance by
Jennifer Brinkerhoff (2012). In her study, Brinkerhoff examines diaspora-government relations
within the context of enabling environments. The framework that she proposes once again does not
mention PCD explicitly but it does refer to some core ideas. Her discussion of “mandating,” “facili-
tating” and “resourcing” directly addresses internal PCD. What Brinkerhoff calls “partnering” and
“endorsing” are signiﬁcant for inter-organizational coherence.
This exercise is not intended to criticize the rich literature on diaspora philanthropy, including
the excellent work cited above. However, should diaspora philanthropy be considered a new form
of development cooperation, then it needs to be embedded in the international norms that guide the
global development agenda, including PCD.
One can view PCD in relation to diaspora philanthropy at three policy levels: 1) coherence
within diasporas, 2) partnership coherence between diasporas and the development cooperation
community and 3) the normative signiﬁcance of diaspora philanthropy and its impact on develop-
ment cooperation and migration. Identiﬁcation of these three levels is important because it recog-
nizes the different meanings that the actions of diasporas hold in relation to development
cooperation strategies and migration management.
Intra-diaspora coherence is mentioned in almost every study of diaspora philanthropy. It
addresses the dynamics within diaspora communities and discusses how diasporas can expand and
improve their initiatives. For example, the IOM-MPI handbook mentioned above identiﬁed numer-
ous tools aimed at improving policy efﬁciency, such as improving knowledge of diasporas through
statistical analysis, public consultation, capacity-building and ﬁnancial tools.
Inter-organizational coherence refers to the relationship between diasporas and governments.
Aspects of this type of coherence are also discussed at length within the literature on diaspora phi-
lanthropy with the aim of improving policy effectiveness. The aforementioned IOM-MPI handbook
introduces policy tools such as the establishment or adaptation of government institutions for dias-
pora philanthropy, twinning between municipalities in host and home states through diaspora medi-
ation, integrating diasporas into development policy planning, and monitoring and evaluation of
diaspora philanthropy initiatives.
TABLE 1
TYPOLOGIES OF POLICY INCOHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT
Horizontal incoherence Incoherence between development aid and non-aid policies
Vertical incoherence Incoherence between policies of regional organizations and member states
Inter-donor incoher-
ence
Incoherence between development policies of a region’s different member
states
Internal incoherence Inconsistencies between the objectives and means of a given policy
Inter-organizational
incoherence
Incoherence between the development policies of a donor country’s govern-
ment and civil society organizations
Multilateral incoher-
ence
Incompatibility between the development goals and procedural norms of inter-








Incoherence between policy strategies in development and non-develop-
ment policy arenas and core values of liberal democratic societies
Source: Table compiled by the author
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While these types of PCD are signiﬁcant and they have been discussed in diaspora philanthropy
studies using other language, they still frame coherence as a simple policy tool. Thus far, normative
dimensions of PCD have been ignored. The post-2015 sustainable development agenda intends to
promote transformative development deﬁned as universal development strategies that promote
human rights and social justice at the local level and address power imbalances in the global politi-
cal arena. The SDGs address development relationships through SDG #10, that focuses on “the
reduction of inequality within and among countries,” and SDG #16 which aims to “to promote
peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and
build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.” This article contends that these
transformative development goals require normative change in global migration politics. For this
reason, normative coherence for development has been highlighted in Table 1 above. This concept
was introduced in the literature on PCD by Koff and Maganda (2016) and it is deﬁned in this case
as coherence between development and migration policies and core democratic values.
Of course, power relationships dominate global migration discussions and migration policies in
host countries remain securitized. This has led to policy convergence amongst advanced industrial
states (many of which are development aid donor countries) around four policy mechanisms: 1)
adoption of conditionality in development aid which includes measures to supress unauthorized
migration, 2) the promotion of multilateral and bilateral agreements for repatriation of “illegal”
migrants, 3) the externalization of border and migration controls to neighbouring states through
ﬁnancial transfers and 4) the establishment of migrant processing centres in third countries for the
deportation of unauthorized migrants to sending countries. Development aid plays a facilitating role
in all four policy mechanisms for migration control.
This point can be exempliﬁed through a comparison of EU and US migration policies in relation to
development cooperation. Despite recognition by the development agencies of both polities that
migration can positively impact development cooperation, migration policies remain highly securi-
tized and affect regional development strategies. In the Americas, the US has regionalized its security
strategies through different initiatives. The Plan Sur (also known as the Merida Initiative) was initially
funded from 2007-2010 with US$ 1.6 billion in order to provide US military technology, intelligence
and training to Mexico in the war against transnational organized crime. In 2014, the US contributed
US$ 112 million in technology to Mexico’s Southern border control efforts, including biometric
kiosks, scanners, X-ray machines, the construction of federal police and customs stations, helicopters,
ships, communications and training (Red de documentacion de las organizaciones defensoras de
migrantes, 2014: p. 62.).
The United States has renewed the Plan Sur with a more regional focus by investing further in
Central America and the Caribbean and establishing links with the similar Plan Colombia in South
America. This regionalization of homeland security has been complemented by development coop-
eration through the Mesoamerica Project (known as the Plan Puebla Panama (PPP) until 2009),
including US$ 3.5 billion of funding in:







• Disaster Prevention and Mitigation
The Mesoamerica Project is a regional development initiative that includes ten member states
(Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
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Nicaragua, and Panama). In addition to the US, funding comes from national governments in the
region, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the private sector, the Central American Bank
for Economic Integration (BCIE), and the World Bank.
The project represents a regional approach to “development, security and stability.” This is evi-
dent in its relationship to migration. When Mexican President Pe~na Nieto announced Mexico’s Pro-
gramma Frontera Sur, the 2014 policy aimed at preventing northward migration from Central
America, he did so in the company of then Guatemalan President Otto Perez Molina stating that
border controls should not represent walls but instead they should be part of a “humanitarian vision
of development, commerce and close cooperation” (http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/articulos-prensa/
pone-en-marcha-el-presidente-enrique-pena-nieto-el-programmea-frontera-sur/). Consequently, even
though migration and security are not explicitly designated as prioritized policy arenas, they are
present in the programme’s agenda.
Scholars of this initiative, such as Villafuerte Solis and Leyva Solano (2006) have argued that
both the Plan Sur and the Mesoamerica Project have securitized non-security policy objectives. In
line with these criticisms, numerous anti-PPP social movements were established in Mexico and
Central America when the plan was announced to protest the securitization of development and
migration (see Collombon, 2008). The appearance of these movements indicates signiﬁcant civil
society dissatisfaction with the Mesoamerica Project within Latin America. One point of contention
states that the type of development supported by the programme, which is based on infrastructure
megaprojects, poorly addresses the lack of PCD in the ﬁeld of migration and critics contend that
such development will actually contribute to further economic displacement, especially in rural
areas (see Furlong and Netzahualcoyotzi, 2012). Consequently, regionalized migration-develop-
ment-security strategies in the Americas are characterized by various policy incoherences, including
horizontal incoherence, inter-organization incoherence, multilateral incoherence and above all,
normative incoherence because the goal of these initiatives is security rather than development.
Despite its institutional and legal commitment to PCD, the EU has followed a similar migration-
development policy strategy. Like the United States, the European Union has made the regionaliza-
tion of security policies a priority in its political agenda. The EU has been able to formalize this
strategy through treaties and aid agreements. Since the 2002 Seville Council meeting, the EU has
strengthened its efforts to control its external borders, including 1) the harmonization of measures
to combat illegal migration, including the creation of a common visa identiﬁcation system, acceler-
ation of the conclusion of readmission agreements with speciﬁc countries identiﬁed by the Council
and approval for elements of a programme on expulsion and repatriation policies, 2) progressive
operationalization of coordinated and integrated administration of external borders and 3) the
integration of immigration policy in the relations of the Union with third countries.
Obviously, the last of these characteristics of EU migration strategies is most relevant to discus-
sions of PCD. Migration control was further strengthened by the so–called Hague Programme,
announced in November 2004, which established a ﬁve–year (2005–2010) multi–annual project in
the ﬁeld of justice and security that set “reinforcement of partnerships with third countries to tackle
illegal immigration” as a priority for the Commission. Scholars of EU migration policies (Lavanex,
2006) have documented the externalization of European Union migration controls. Aside from the
establishment of FRONTEX, the common European border enforcement agency, the EU has funded
technical assistance in third countries and integrated migration into regional security strategies
through the “Global Approach to Migration Management” (GAMM).
The institutionalization of the role of migration in the context of development cooperation
between Europe and Africa ofﬁcially occurred through the establishment of the Cotonou Partner-
ship Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Paciﬁc (ACP) states and the
European Union and its Member States. Speciﬁcally articles 13, 79 and 80 of the Agreement speci-
ﬁed the role of migration in development partnerships. In particular Article 13 introduced a read-
mission clause requiring any ACP State to re-admit “its nationals illegally present on the territory”
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of one of the States party to the agreement as well as migrants from other countries who have tran-
sited through its territory. This clause also provided for the negotiation of bilateral agreements
amongst parties to the agreement to govern “the speciﬁc obligations for the readmission and return”
of clandestine migrants (art. 13, para. 5).
This decision-making does not support the idea that the EU is more committed to PCD than the
US or other advanced industrial polities For example, scholars have noted that the signing of trade
agreements and concessions of economic aid are subject to the application of “best practices”
in the ﬁeld of migration (Miranda et al., 2012). Subsequently, these themes have been developed in
the various multilateral initiatives on migration issues involving the EU and its African partners. In
2005, the European Council established the GAMM, prioritizing actions in Africa and the Mediter-
ranean with the main objectives of “reducing illegal migration ﬂows and the loss of human lives
and assuring the return of illegal immigrants in safe conditions” (Conseil Europeen, 2005: 9). This
approach also provided that any partnership between the EU and Africa must systematically include
aspects related to the management of legal migration, the ﬁght against illegal migration and, the
promotion of the link between migration and development. These objectives have most recently
been institutionalized in the West Africa Regional Initiative (2015) signed by the EU with the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), l’Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest.
Africaine (UEMOA) and member states. The EU will provide € 1.15 billion of funding for the
initiative through 2020 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5309_en.htm).
Within these initiatives, the link between migration and development has speciﬁcally been articu-
lated through two sets of measures: 1) the outsourcing of border controls, through the sharing of
responsibilities in the ﬁght against illegal immigration with African countries (short-medium term
goal), 2) the promotion of co-development, understood as development partnerships with African
countries with the aim of restricting incentives for unwanted migration (long-term objective). The
ﬁrst Euro-African Intergovernmental Conference on Migration led to a declaration asserting the
need to achieve a concerted management of migration in Africa, through the implementation of
development projects. This conference was closely followed by another in Tripoli (November
2006) which resulted in a joint statement discussing “strategies to reduce poverty” and “co-develop-
ment of African countries” as key points to reduce ﬂows of migrants and refugees. The proposed
solutions included the promotion of foreign direct investment, cooperation processes and regional
economic integration in Africa through the signing of Economic Partnership Agreements.
Within this framework, the EU has unlocked speciﬁc budgets since 2001 to ﬁnance projects with
the main objective of controlling illegal migration (Commission Europeenne, 2010). The EU allo-
cated €40 million for “migration” under the Ninth European Development Fund (EDF). €10 million
has been dedicated to the creation of a migration information management (CIGEM) centre in Mali.
This centre was established in 2008 following the signature of a joint declaration on “Migration
and Development” between Mali, ECOWAS, France, Spain and the European Commission, on 8
February 2007. Also under the 9th EDF, €5.5 million were granted to Mauritania (€ 3 million) and
Senegal (€ 2.5 million) for the establishment of “rapid response mechanisms for the ﬁght against
illegal migration to the European Union.” (Commission Europeenne, 2010)
Consequently, this is the political context in which diaspora philanthropy has emerged in Europe
and the Americas. This article contends that the securitization of migration by the US and the EU
(amongst other donors) has created a normative framework which is detrimental to diaspora philan-
thropy initiatives. Almost all of the academic and policy studies on diaspora philanthropy, includ-
ing the aforementioned IOM-MPI handbook, identify trust between governments, NGOs and
migrants as the key building block for successful initiatives. However, this point of view has only
been directed at home countries. For example, the IOM-MPI handbook states: “A general lack of
trust in the non-proﬁt sector and charitable institutions in countries of diaspora origin may lead
migrants to focus their contributions on family members and established institutions.” (Agunias and
Newland, 2012: p. 201) It is important to ask whether the securitization of development and
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migration by host states does not undermine trust to the same extent if not more. This issue is
explored in the conclusion below.
CONCLUSION
Diaspora Philanthropy has recently been promoted by international organizations because it is a
paradigm that ﬁts the moment. In a period of expanding development cooperation objectives com-
bined with signiﬁcant ﬁnancial constraints, diaspora philanthropy can potentially help development
communities meet many needs by facilitating the infusion of private resources, fostering participa-
tive development models, mediating twinning between local actors in host and home countries, and
promoting innovative partnerships between governments and NGOs. In short, diaspora philanthropy
meets the complex programme needs of the current multilateral architecture of international devel-
opment cooperation.
This narrative offers hope for future innovative development partnerships related to diaspora phi-
lanthropy. Nonetheless, the present article contends that the current political atmosphere surround-
ing immigration will negatively affect the formulation and implementation of diaspora philanthropy
programmes and this needs to be discussed more explicitly in the academic and policy literatures.
If “trust” is viewed as the building block of effective development partnerships, then present migra-
tion policy positions must be considered incoherent with diaspora philanthropy objectives. Already,
FIGURE 1
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the EU has witnessed numerous states (France, Denmark, Hungary, etc.) suspend the Schengen
Agreement temporarily in response to Europe’s asylum crises.
These nationalist policy positions in the ﬁeld of migration must be considered incoherent with
diaspora philanthropy. One must ask: Why should migrants invest in projects in their home coun-
tries in sectors which have been securitized politically through regional development initiatives? At
present, the existing relationships between regional security, diaspora philanthropy and development
are asymmetrical as shown in Figure 1 and the globalized nature of diaspora philanthropy is incom-
patible with the overarching debates over state and border sovereignty. Moreover, the regionaliza-
tion of security through development cooperation also negatively affects transparency and rule of
law, which are pillars of diaspora philanthropy because investment depends on their presence. Crit-
ics of EU and US migration policies have contended that the regionalization of security initiatives
in the Union for the Mediterranean and the Mesoamerica Initiative have negatively impacted trans-
parency and rule of law in border regions in Morocco and Libya on one hand and Mexico on the
other, which has led to abuses of the human rights of migrants and citizens alike (see United
Nations, 2015b; Cordova and Rodriguez, 2015).
The UNDP has contended that diaspora philanthropy is an innovative paradigm in development
cooperation but that it must evolve beyond discussions in once a year summits and be structurally
implemented in development cooperation strategies (Grady, 2014). This article contends that inter-
national organizations must integrate PCD into their reﬂections on diaspora philanthropy and devel-
opment in order for this to occur. Speciﬁcally, these organizations should implement mechanisms
that target normative coherence for development that matches global migration and development
strategies to the core values of the development community as stated in the SDGs and the 2011
Busan Development Agreement. By doing so, the goal of this community should be the
FIGURE 2
HYPOTHETICAL GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF DIASPORA PHILANTHROPY
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establishment of a balanced migration-development regime in which security is pursued in order to
promote development (see Figure 2), thus reversing the political relationship which exists today.
Diaspora philanthropy could play a signiﬁcant role in this process In order for transformative
development as expressed in the SDGs to occur, development cooperation and migration manage-
ment must reﬂect the globalized community in which we live. At present, securitized migration and
development policies aim to reinforce the sovereignty of donors, sometimes at the expense of the
sovereignty of aid recipients. Diaspora philanthropy’s long-term contribution to development
cooperation will hopefully be the infusion of normative coherence for development as diasporas
often represent communities of global citizens committed to equitable and transformative global
development.
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